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Abstract
The expression “bipolar information” denotes
the fact that positive and negative information
are not processed in the same way. This study
aimed at testing the psychological plausibility of
the possibilistic treatment of bipolar
information. Rather than testing empirically
some predictions derived from possibility
theory, we tested whether the possibilistic
representation of bipolarity allows
understanding previously unexplained
psychological data. Psychological works related
to Human hypothesis testing furnished the task
for this study, namely, the “2-4-6 rule discovery
task”. Based on an analysis of the status
(“impossible”, “guaranteed possible”, “non
impossible”) of the states of the world ruled out
or allowed by positive or negative pieces of
information, we found that the so-called
“positive test strategy” (previously seen as
irrational) produces on the whole information
less uncertain than the concurrent so-called
“negative test strategy” (previously seen as the
normative one). Further works on the same line
of research are pointed out.
Keywords: Bipolarity, possibility theory,
hypothesis testing, positive and negative
information.
1     Introduction
Bipolar information is pervasive in human
mental life and behavior. Many times a day, in
order to make a choice, to solve a problem or to
understand texts or discourses, we must combine
positive and negative preferences; pieces of
information that rule out some states of affair
with pieces of information that emphasize the
plausibility of other states of affair or
hypotheses; aspirations (desires) and rejections
( versions)… As such, human mind seems to be
expert in the processing of bipolar information,
and it seems very likely that a large part of this
expertise would not be acquired, but would be
the result of the cognitive evolution of the
specie. It would be a direct consequence of the
mind and affect system(s) architecture(s) [3],
[13].
Curiously, very few psychological studies have
been devoted to or have integrated
considerations on bipolar information. To our
knowledge, until recently, the same conclusion
holds in artificial intelligence studies. However,
Ughetto, Dubois and Prade [17], Dubois, Hajeck
and Prade [6], and Van der Torre and Weidert
[18] have advocated the idea that there exist
situations where the information could be
bipolar. This idea has been explored in
particular in possibility theory (see also [1], [8]).
The possibilistic treatment of bipolarity
proposes that two kinds of information
corresponding to different notions of possibility
are involved in problem solving tasks. The first
one is close to the classical view in logical
modeling according to which (i) each piece of
information declares some worlds as impossible
and (ii) what is possible is what is consistent
with what is known [7]. Following this view,
every piece of information conjunctively added
to a data base acts as negative information, and
states of the world that are not ruled out by
negative information – not being not impossible
- are possible. The second kind of information
allows representing what is possible for sure,
that is, what is guaranteed possible, since it has
been observed, for example. This kind of
information is said positive, and pieces of
positive information are combined disjunctively.
Hence, the possibilistic framework allows to
distinguish between impossible (I), guaranteed
possible (D) and non-impossible (NI) states of
the world given the positive or the negative
nature of some piece of information. In terms of
uncertainty, I is more certain than D and D is
more certain than NI.
In line with previous studies of the
psychological plausibility of possibility theory
and possibilistic logic [2], [5], [16], this paper
addresses the question of the psychological
plausibility of the possibilistic representation of
bipolarity. More precisely, do human recognize
and make use of negative and positive pieces of
information in a manner compatible with the
possibilistic framework?
A classical way of investigation would be to
produce experimental data in order to test the fit
between human productions with the
possibilistic machinery(ies) ones. The formal
outcomes would be collected first given a
relevant set of axioms or properties. Next, an
experimental device would be constructed so as
to immerse participants into conditions able to
provoke the kind of mental activity (e.g.
judgment, reasoning, decision-making tasks…)
under consideration. Human productions (e.g.
score values on numerical or qualitative scales;
choices; response times)) should be recorded
and compared to the formal conclusions
previously derived according to some statistical
criteria.
In previous works devoted to the psychological
study of possibility theory (e.g. [2], [5], [16])
this methodology has allowed to confirm that
possibility theory and possibilistic logic have a
strong descriptive power with regard to human
judgment and reasoning under uncertainty. Such
a work could and should be done with tasks
involving bipolar information. A less classical
way of investigation is to search if possibility
theory can illuminate any unexplained
psychological phenomena involving bipolar
information. This is the way followed in this
paper.
Section 2 introduces previous psychological
results related to human hypothesis testing.
Hypothesis testing tasks are particularly relevant
to our objective because they are known as
involving positive and negative pieces of
uncertain information, and because it has been
recognized that participants in experiments
exhibits what has been seen initially as a
cognitive bias. Section 3 presents an analysis of
testers’ strategies based on the possibilistic
treatment of bipolarity. It is argued that the tests
preferred by participants are those that exhibit
the best epistemic utility in order to reduce the
uncertainty attached to the issues of the tests.
Section 4 presents some critics and future
extensions to this work.
2     Empirical results in human
hypothesis testing
I  cognitive psychology, Wason [19] explicitly
studied human hypothesis testing (HHT) the
first time. Wason's analysis of HHT was based
on the falsificationist theory of the philosopher
Karl Popper [15] who proposed that theories in
science should be exposed to empirical
falsification. He considered that it should also
apply to to common sense knowledge and
human reasoning. Clearly, the falsificationist
principle focuses on negative information, that
is, pieces of evidence that rule out some worlds
as impossible. In the field of philosophy of
science, Popper's theory has been opposed to
logical positivism [4]. Following logical
positivism, statements only have meaning if they
are capable of being verified. As such, this
theory focuses on confirmation rather
falsification, is inductive rather than deductive,
and focuses on positive information rather on
negative one. Wason and most psychologists
have adopted the principle of falsification rather
than that of confirmation as a standard for
HHT1.
Wason designed two tasks for the study of
human rationality in hypothesis testing: the
"selection task" and the "rule discovery task".
Here, we will focus on the latter one, but both
tasks continue to be replicated and analyzed in
recent research. In the rule discovery task, also
called “2-4-6 task”, participants have the job of
discovering a rule governing a combination of
three numbers. In Wason’s classical
experiments, the rule to discover was “three
                                            
1 See however Poletiek [15] for an unified view.
numbers in increasing order of sequence”, and
the example given was “2-4-6”. The task
consisted of testing hypotheses until the rule had
been discovered. Classically, participants
enunciate one by one triples of three numbers,
and for each triple, the experimenter responds
“yes” or “no”. “Yes” means “the triple conforms
to the rule”, and “no” means “the triple does not
conform to the rule”. When the tester considers
that he has discovered the correct rule, he
proposes this rule to the experimenter. The task
is over if the rule is the correct one or continues
until the correct rule be discovered.
Wason distinguished between a confirming and
a falsifying strategy. The confirming strategy
consists in giving triples that conform to the
participant hypothesis concerning the rule (e.g.
“2-6-8” for the rule “three even numbers in
increasing order of sequence”). The falsifying
strategy consists in giving triples that do not
conform to the rule (e.g. “3-5-7”). For Wason, a
participant is rational only when he applies a
falsifying strategy. Finally, he founded that very
few intelligent adults spontaneously seek to
falsify their beliefs and concluded that common
sense hypothesis testing exhibited a
“confirmation bias”.
This conclusion has been however discussed by
several authors [9], [10], [11], [12], [14], [20]
who argued that given the common hypothesis
initially formulated by most participants (“three
even numbers in increasing order of sequence”),
participants cannot refute the induced
hypothesis. Indeed, all triples that fulfill this
hypothesis also fulfill the target rule (“3
numbers in increasing order of sequence”). As
such, the efficiencies of the confirming and
falsifying strategies depend on the kind of
relation between the participant’s hypothesis and
the target rule the experimenter has in mind. In
addition, it has been pointed out that when
participants present a triple that does not
conform to their hypothesis and which they do
not expect to conform to the rule, they are not
seeking a falsification but rather a confirmation.
Conversely, apparent confirmation seeking can
correspond to falsification seeking (see [12],
[14], [20]). Therefore, confirmative and
eliminative test strategies can both produce
positive and negative information.
These analyses have led to the introduction of
two kinds of strategies called “positive test
strategy” and “negative test strategy”. However,
the question remains: why do participants
preferentially use positive test strategy rather
than negative test strategy?
The main idea is that the human tendency to
prefer positive tests against negative ones is
based on a maximization of the “epistemic
utility” of these two strategies. The informal
notion of epistemic utility in this work
represents the gain of information, belief or
knowledge that each strategy is able to provide
in relation to the truth or the falsity of some
hypothesis. More precisely, participants in the 2-
4-6 task should prefer positive test strategy
because, when the nature of the relation between
their hypothesis and the experimenter’s rule is
unknown, its repeated application (in particular
at the beginning and at the end of the hypothesis
testing process) should overall permit to draw
less uncertain conclusions than the negative test
strategy.
In the next section, we present an analysis of the
epistemic utility of the use by participants of the
positive and negative test strategies based on the
bipolar possibilistic treatment of positive and
negative information. These analyses are
conducted given the four possible kinds of
relations between the participant’s hypothesis
and the target rule (this relation being
unknown).
3     How bipolarity in possibility theory
can explain “the confirmation bias” in the
2-4-6 task?
Consider the general case where the participant
(P) has in mind a hypothesis h belonging to the
set Hc of the rules that can generate the triple 2-
4-6. P can produce two kinds of triples (t) in
relation to h: incompatibles (ti) or compatibles
(tc). Before any feedback from the experimenter
(E), any rule h that leads to at least one triple of
the ti kind cannot be said impossible in relation
to the target rule, nor it can be said guaranteed
possible: it is only non-impossible (NI). After
the feedback of E, if t is a ti instance of the
target rule R, h is falsified but any hypothetic
rule able to generate t is guaranteed possible
because one instance of the rule has been
bserved. If t is not an instance of R, h is not
falsified but every rule able to generate t is
impossible.
By comparison, before any feedback from E,
any rule h belonging to Hc is guaranteed
possible - although still uncertain and possibly
false - because at least one positive instance of
the rule is known, namely the 2-4-6 triple. After
a feedback from the experimenter, any
confirmation does not change the status of h
since this rule is already guaranteed possible.
Yet, h receives more inductive support. If h is
falsified, every rule able to generate t is also
impossible.
Let us consider now the consequences of the
“yes” or “no” feedback given the kind of
relation between the participant’s hypothesis and
the target rule.
Let U be the set of all possible triples of 3
numbers, Tr be the set of triples compatible with
the target rule (e.g. “3 numbers in increasing
order of sequence”), and Th be the set of triples
compatible with the hypothesis rule under
consideration by the participant (e.g. “three even
numbers in increasing order of sequence”).
Figure 1: Case where the participant’s
hypothesis (h) is included in the target rule (R).
First, consider the case represented in figure 1,
where Th Ì Tr. Let us also consider the case
where the participant applies the positive test
strategy and proposes for example the triple 8-
10-12 (which belongs to both Th and Tr). In
such a case, the “no” feedback from the
experimenter will never occur, because every
triple t in Th is also in Tr. The only possible
response being “yes”, every hypothesis that
generates t is guaranteed possible (D). Consider
now the case where P applies the negative test
strategy. If the triple t belongs to Tr, it will
receive a positive feedback, which falsifies the
participant’s hypothesis h and establishes the
impossibility of every hypothesis compatible
with t (note that this response carries also
positive information related to Tr). If t does not
belong to Tr, the feedback is negative and it can
b concluded that the hypotheses belonging to
the set Ht of the rules able to generate t are NI.
For convenience, in the sequel of the paper, we
will say “Ht is NI”, “Ht is I” and “Ht is D”. It is
to b  noted that we cannot concluded that Ht is
guaranteed possible, because there is no positive
information per se in this case.
Second, consider the case represented in figure
2, where Th Ç Tr ¹ Æ and Th Ë Tr.
Figure 2: Case where the target rule (R) partially
overlaps the participant’s hypothesis (h).
When applying the positive test strategy, P
receives a positive or a negative feedback
depending on whether t belongs to Tr or not. If t
belongs to Tr, the feedback is positive and Ht is
D. If t does not belong to Tr, the feedback is
negative, and Ht is impossible. When P applies
the negative test strategy, if t belongs to Tr, the
feedback is “yes”, and Ht is impossible. If t does
not belong to Tr, Ht is NI.
Figure 3: Case where the target rule (R) does not
overlap the participant’s hypothesis (h).
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Third, consider the case represented in figure 3,
where Th Ç Tr = Æ. When P applies the positive
test strategy, it can only lead to a negative
feedback. Then, participant’s hypothesis is
falsified and Ht is I. When P applies the
negative test strategy, if t belongs to Tr, the
feedback is “yes”, which carries a positive
information about Tr but falsifies h. If t does not
belong to Tr, h is falsified and Ht is NI.
Finally, consider the case represented in figure 4
where Tr Ì Th and Tr ¹ Th. When P applies the
positive test strategy, if t belongs to Tr, the
feedback is positive, h is confirmed, and Ht is D.
If t does not belong to Tr, the feedback is
negative, and Ht is I. When P applies the
negative test strategy, the feedback can only be
negative, and Ht is NI.
Figure 4: Case where the target rule (Tr) is
included in the participant’s hypothesis (h).
Assuming that, in one hand, the negative and
positive cases under consideration have the
same likelihood, and in the other hand, the four
kinds of relations between Th and Tr have also
the same likelihood, the examination of table 1
shows that a positive test provides either
information guaranteed possible (3 cases out of
6) or impossible (3 cases out of 6), while a
negative test provides either an information non-
impossible (3 cases out of 7) or impossible (4
cases out of 7). Therefore, given that I is more
certain than D, and D is more certain than NI,
overall, it appears that the application of the
positive test strategy leads to conclusions less
uncertain than the negative test one. Moreover,
whatever the kind of the relation between the
participant’s hypothesis and the target rule, a
negative test can potentially produce a less
certain conclusion in 3 cases out of 4. By
contrast, a positive test strategy can potentially
produce a conclusion at least as certain as the
negative test strategy in 3 cases out of 4,
including the one missing previously. In a way,
participants applying a negative test strategy
could be seen has more optimistic than the ones
applying a positive test strategy. Indeed,
negative test strategy produces more often
impossible hypotheses, that is the kind of
information the more certain. However, this
very same strategy produces also more often
non-impossible hypotheses, that is the kind of
information the less certain.
Table 1: Plausibility of the set Ht of rules
compatible with any triple t in function of the
kind of test (positive or negative) and the kind of
relation between the participant’s hypothesis (H)
and the experimenter’s rule (R).
Relation Positive test Negative test
Th Ì Tr Yes: D
No: --
Yes: I
No: NI
Th Ç Tr ¹ Æ
and Th Ë Tr
Yes: D
No: I
Yes: I
No: NI
Th Ç Tr = Æ Yes: --
No: I
Yes: I
No: NI
Tr Ì Th and
Tr ¹ Th
Yes: D
No: I
Yes: --
No: I
“D” stands for “guaranteed possible”, “I” for “impossible”,
“NI” for “non impossible”, and “—“for “non-tractable”.
4     Conclusion
This study has been conducted with the goal of
testing the psychological plausibility of the
possibilistic treatment of bipolar information.
Rather than testing empirically (as in previous
works) some predictions derived from
possibility theory, we aimed at showing that the
bipolar possibilistic representation allows to
explain previously unexplained psychological
data. Human hypothesis testing (involving the
use of positive and negative information, and
exhibiting some unexplained results), furnished
the task for this study, namely, the 2-4-6 rule
discovery task.
Based on an analysis of the status (impossible,
guaranteed possible, non impossible) of the
information given (“yes” or “no” response) as a
function of the participant’s testing strategy
(positive or negative) and the kind of relation
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between the participants’ hypothesis and the
target rule, we have found that the positive test
strategy produces on the whole less uncertain
information than the concurrent negative test
strategy (classically seen as the normative one).
This result emphasizes the psychological
plausibility of the possibilistic framework.
However, we assumed that the negative and
positive cases under consideration have the
same likelihood. Further work should be based
on the assumption that it is not the case.
Moreover, it could be of particular interest to
study whether participants are able to infer the
kind of relation existing between the hypothesis
h under consideration and the target rules R, and
if they are able to adapt their testing strategies as
a function of the four possible kinds of
relationship between h and R.
In addition, further experimental studies should
be conducted in order to verify that the certainty
hierarchy we have established between the kinds
of pieces of information (I, D and NI) is
psychologically relevant for subjects in the
considered contexts. Moreover, the same
methodology should be applied in the context of
another hypothesis testing tasks, in particular the
so called selection task (see [14] for example),
and further work should also be based on a more
classic experimental approach in the line of
previous works [2], [5], [16].
Finally, in this paper, our analyses and
conclusions concerned both human hypothesis
testing and the possibilistic framework. We used
the possibilistic framework to analyze the
hypothesis testing task thereby showing the
potential interest of a well-known result in the
psychology literature: people use more often the
positive rather than the negative test strategy.
However, we did not try to formalize human
hypothesis testing in a possibilistic framework
per se. Yet, our understanding of human
reasoning might benefit greatly from such a
work, which in turn should allow testing deeply
the possibilistic treatment of polarity.
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